A supervision mechanism of unsafe behavior of employees based on evolutionary game theory

Authors

  • Juan Shi School of Management Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, Tianjin China
  • Jiumei Zhang School of Management Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, Tianjin China
  • Xiaojie Xu School of Management Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, Tianjin China

Abstract

A model representing “production staff-safety supervisor†behavior interactions is constructed based on evolutionary game theory. The model is solved and analyzed, and the behavior strategy choices and the change of the stable state of the production staff and the safety supervisor under different circumstances are discussed . The results show that: the stable state of employee unsafe behavior supervision is not related the profit. Rather, the stable state of supervision of employees’ unsafe behavior is related to the cost of safety behavior paid by production staff, the probability of occurrence of safety accidents, the loss after the safety accident and the supervision cost. The analysis also provides reasonable and effective supervision measures and suggestions for enterprises to control the unsafe behavior of employees and reduce the accidents during production caused by unsafe behavior.

Keywords: Safety behavior, Safety supervision, Evolutionary game, Unsafe behavior

Cite As

J. Shi, J. Zhang, X. Xu, "A supervision mechanism of unsafe behavior of employees based on evolutionary
game theory.", Engineering Intelligent Systems, vol. 26 no. 2-3, pp. 91-98, 2018.



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Published

2018-06-01

Issue

Vol. 26 No. 2-3 (2018): International Journal of Engineering Intelligent Systems

Section

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